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Abstract 
 
We estimate a model to account for homicide cycles in Colombia, 1950-
1999. The variables that together account for about eighty percent of the 
variation in murder cycles are the years of Colombia’s La Violencia 
period, the years of collusion between the two establishment parties (the 
National Front years), the inflation-adjusted trade balance and real 
social expenditure, both in per capita terms, and the size of Colombia=s 
military forces as a proxy for all armed forces (military, para-military, 
guerrilla, and drug-related) in the country. 
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   Latin American countries record, by far, the highest homicide rates 
in the world, averaging 20 to 30 murders per 100,000 people. This is 
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two to three times as many as the next most violent regions of the world  
(Guerrero, 1998; Londoño, 1998, p. 72).  Within Latin America, 
Colombia is known for its extremely high levels of homicidal violence, 
resulting in one of the highest murder rates in the world. According to 
Colombian National Police statistics, homicides increased from around 
5,000 per year in the 1950s and 1960s to about 10,000 per year by 1980 
and to about 25,000 per year by 1990. A further surge to nearly 30,000 
murders per year was seen in the early 1990s. This has moderated 
somewhat but, in absolute numbers, still hovers between 20,000 to 
25,000 per year or around 50 murders per 100,000 people (figure 1). 
 
  The country´s murder rate varies substantially not only over time, 
but also from region to region (Dinar and Keck, 1997, pp. 9 -10; 
Guerrero, 1998, pp. 96-97; Londoño, 1998, p. 76), with rates as low as 
16/100,000 that would be regarded as near Anormal@ elsewhere to rates 
as high as 900/100,000 (Guerrero, 1998, p. 97). 
 
These numbers underestimate the truth. Following a survey, Rubio 
(1998a, p. 606) writes that even for murder, “more than half o f the 
households victimized stated that they had ‘not done anything’, and 
only 38 percent reported that they had made a formal complaint” to the 
authorities. Comparing separate statistical reporting by the police and 
the justice agencies Rubio finds wide disparities for more than a quarter 
of Colombia’s municipalities. The disparities are largest in International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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municipalities characterized by the presence of an armed force 
(military, para-military, drug-gangs, or guerrillas; Rubio, 1998a, p. 
607). Apparently, victims fear reprisals. 
 
Without doubt, Colombia´s murderous violence is related to two of 
its most salient features, the drug trade and the political violence, both 
of which have marred the country for decades. Less well-known and 
appreciated is that these two factors account only for a portion of all 
murders in the country (Guerrero, 1998, p. 98). For murder, the primary 
risk factors are alcohol consumption and possession of firearms. A 
quarter of all murders take place on Sundays, more than half on Friday, 
Saturday, and Sunday, with disproportionate increases on holidays. 
Most murders are non-political, take place at night, in urban areas, are 
committed by poor people on poor people, and alcohol is frequently 
found in the victims (Londoño, 1998, p. 75), although G uerrero 
observes that while alcohol consumption might explain the high levels it 
cannot explain the drastic changes in violence in Colombia in the 1980s 
and 1990s (1998, p. 98). 
 
Studies have failed to establish links between murderous violence 
and poverty rates, unemployment rates, urbanization rates, or rates of 
economic growth (Londoño, 1998, p. 74; Guerrero, 1998, p. 97).
i, ii One 
compelling reason why these failures might have occurred is that the 
time series of homicide data is an amalgam of differently motivated 
murder. (In particular it would seem that the high prevalence and 
incidence of politically motivated murder, well-known from the 
narrative literature and the news media, needs to be subtracted out of the 
overall homicide data series.) This suggests that homicide data series 
should be decomposed into trend and cyclical information. Once the 
cyclical component is subtracted out, lack of economic opportunity, 
unemployment, poverty, urbanization, breakdowns in the justice system, 
and so forth might then well explain trend levels of murder. 
 
By the same token, one might build a model that explains not trend 
homicide data but the cyclical data. To do so is the purpose of this 
paper. Inasmuch as generalized violence is a widely acknowledged Brauer, J. and Gomez-Sorzano, A.            Homicides Cycles in Colombia, 1950-1999 
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impediment to economic and social development, our work should be of 
considerable interest to a wide range of scholars and practitioners. 
 
Data and methods 
 
  Cyclical murder data are taken from Brauer, et al. (2004). Other 
data were collected in Colombia from various Colombian sources and 
adjusted for inflation and population growth (see data source appendix 
for a detailed description). The estimation method used is multiple 
regression analysis. Special attention was paid to functional form and 
regression diagnostics.  Because of the sharp downturn in cyclical 
murder after 1991, we run our models separately for 1950-1991 as well 





  In Colombia, the time-period from 1946 to 1957 (or, in Bushnell’s, 
1993, discussion from 1947 to 1960) is generally referred to as  La 
Violencia, a period of intense power clashes between the “liberal” and 
“conservative” parties, mingled with a brief, overt military intervention 
(1954-1958) and incipient guerrilla activity. From 1958 to 1978, the two 
main establishment parties came to a peace of sorts and, under the name 
of National Front, arrived at a power-sharing agreement according to 
which the presidency would be swapped between the parties every four 
years, and cabinet and other high-ranking political posts would be 
divided up as well. During those years, cyclical murder fell, even as 
guerrilla activity continued and intensified. After 1978, the power 
sharing arrangement broke down and intense struggles over political 
dominance reemerged, now intensified by cocaine riches. The latter 
brought drug-cartels into the political struggle as well as drug-lords 
sought control over land to grow coca leaves. This, in turn, appears to 
have drawn owners of large-scale land-holdings, generally used for 
cattle-ranching, into the conflict and various para-military groups 
emerged to participate in the struggle.
iii 
A structural model explaining cyclical murder then should contain International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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variables for the  La Violencia and the National Front years. As a first 
approximation this is done in the simplest and most effective way with 
the use of dummy variables. Following Bushnell (1993), we code  La 
Violencia equal to 1 for 1947 to 1960, and we call the variable “B” (for 
Bogotazo, which refers to the violent, murderous rioting in Botogá on 9 
April 1948). The National Front years (“CL”  -conservative/liberal) are 
coded equal to 1 for 1958 to 1978. 
It is not so clear how to best represent the post-1978 years. Whereas 
we do have numbers on the strength of the p olice and armed (i.e., 
military) forces, we are not in possession of such numbers for para-
military, guerrillas, and drug-gangs.
iv It might be argued, however, that 
the police and military personnel numbers reflect information about the 
strength and intensity of the various opposing forces so that, from a 
modeling perspective, the police and military forces can stand as a 
proxy for all armed groups in the country. 
The data show a remarkably constant level of total police (PFp100) 
and military (AFp100) forces B from 400 to 450 per 100,000 people B 
during the National Front years, 1958 to 1978 (the top line in figure 2).  
 
Thereafter, we note a drastic force increase, especially for the period 
from 1983 to 1988 (the shaded area; we refer to the line drawn at 1991 
later on). The 1983-1988 time-period saw heightened, often spectacular, 
guerrilla activity. This is also the time when cocaine become so Brauer, J. and Gomez-Sorzano, A.            Homicides Cycles in Colombia, 1950-1999 
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profitable as to spur competition for control over land and 
corresponding political influence. This mingling of old and new 
economic interests and political control, in which established political 
parties, the police and military, the drug cartels, landowners, and para-
military participated, lasted, roughly, from 1978 to 1991 at which time 
Colombia adopted a new constitution. Also, in June 1991, infamous 
drug-lord Pablo Escobar turned himself in for a jail term to be served in 
Colombia. With the exception of a total security force spike in 1994 and 
1995, the post-1991 period shows a stable level of total security forces 
and reflects relative  political quietude, even as violent conflict carried 
on among the drug cartels. Bushnell (1993) explicitly refers to the post-
1991 era as the “end of war” period (and we will return to this point). 
 
It is not clear that both police a nd military force data should be 
included in the modeling. Examining figure 2 more closely, it does 
appear as if police and armed force strength respond to different 
underlying motivations. In particular, note that during the National 
Front years, the armed force variable declines, picking up in the mid-
1970s as the National Front consensus begins to break apart, and 
increases drastically during the 1980s. In contrast, the police force 
variable moves quite differently. That is, the armed forces variable 
shows more cyclicality than the police force variable (which seems 
more closely associated with trend homicide), and we therefore use the 
armed force in our model. This also has the advantage of reaching back 
to 1950, giving us additional degrees of freedom. In fact, the sharp rise 
in this variable in the early fifties is entirely consistent with the initial 
La Violencia years; it then declines slightly as the military under 
General Rojas Pinilla (1954-1958) assumed direct governmental power. 
 
A different way to characterize the post-1978 period might be with 
the further use of dummy variables such as “all-out-war” (1979-1991) 
and “end-of-war” (post-1991) but the use of a continuous, relevant 
variable such as AFp100 that stretches across the entire time-period 
(1950-1999) is statistically preferred. One might also try multiplicative 
effects, such a  La Violencia with armed forces (BxAFp100) or the 
National Front years with armed forces (CLxAFp100), but it is not clear International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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on theoretical grounds why that would be an improved functional form 
and why one should test for such variables. (One exception is discussed 
later on in this paper.) 
 
Economic variables 
    Repeatedly, the Colombian narrative literature has noted a seemingly 
curious link between commodity-export booms and political violence, 
i.e., between a measure of income flows and cyclical murder. One 
hypothesis is that commodity booms increase the pot-of-gold over 
which it is “worth” fighting.
v One might therefore test the hypothesis 
that, for Colombia, the inflation-adjusted trade balance per capita 
(rTBpcap) is an explanatory variable for murder cycles. An inspection 





There are four time-periods of pronounced improvements in the balance 
of trade (1955-1959; 1971-1975; 1982-1991; and 1994-1999; the 
shaded areas in figure 3). Levels of murderous violence in the first and 
third period are strongly associated with trade balance improvements; 
the second period shows no relation to the trade balance, and the fourth Brauer, J. and Gomez-Sorzano, A.            Homicides Cycles in Colombia, 1950-1999 
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shows an opposite movement. Thus, there might well be something to 
the argument, at least as from the mid-1950s onward, and we include 
this variable in our model. At a minimum, we can test statistically 
whether the suggestion in the narrative literature  B that commodity 
booms are associated with upswings in cyclical homicide B has merit. 
 
Other relevant economic variables are levels of inflation-adjusted 
private consumption per capita (rCpcap) and, perhaps, social 
consumption as reflected in government real social expenditure per 
capita (rSpcap) or real government total consumption expenditure per 
capita (rGOCpcap). Unlike the trade balance variable, private and social 
consumption are not so directly linked to export success and pot-of-gold 
attractions. The hypothesis is that improvements in private and social 
consumption are associated with reduced levels of political unrest, 
general violence, and murder. Since social consumption (health and 
education expenditure) in Colombia is small, we at first thought that the 
more encompassing government consumption variable should be used 
in our model. However, rGOCpcap is highly correlated with the police 
and armed forces variables (on the order of r=0.8), and the expenditure 
on these forces is part of rGOCpcap. It turns out that rSpcap also is 
highly correlated with the force numbers, but at least the variables are 
conceptually different. We therefore decided to use rSpcap, instead of 
rGOCpcap, as our measure of social consumption.
vi 
 
Results and interpretation 
 
Our initial model to be tested thus is (with expected signs preceding the 
variables): 
 
(1)    cvp100 = f (+B, -CL, +rTBpcap, -rCpcap, -rSpcap, +AFp100) 
where; 
cvp100  cyclical murder per 100,000 people 
B    years of  La Violencia (1947-1960, following 
Bushnell=s dating) 
CL    years of the National Front (1958-1978) 
rTBpcap  real trade balance level per capita International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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rCpcap  real private consumption level per capita 
rSpcap  real social (health and education) consumption level 
per capita 
AFp100  number of armed (i.e., military) f orces per 100,000 
people 
 
The monetary variables are measured in millions of pesos, adjusted for 
inflation. To gauge the pronounced “kink” in the cyclical murder data in 
1991 (figure 3), the model is also run for 1950-1991. The initial results 
are displayed in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Initial estimation results 
 
Dependent variable: cvp100; all numbers are rounded 
The first reported numbers are for 1950-1991; bold numbers are for 
1950-1999 
Estimates for 1950-1999 are Newey-West HAC (see text) 
 
Variable  coefficient  std.error  t-stat  p-value 
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(F) = 0.0000 (0.0000) 
 
We first discuss the estimates for the shorter time-period, 1950-
1991 (displayed in regular type font, i.e., not bolded). All coefficient 
estimates conform to our prior expectations. The La Violencia dummy 
(“B”) is positive and statistically significant; the National Front dummy 
(“CL”) is negative and statistically significant.
vii Of the monetary 
variables, the trade balance effect is positive, confirming the narrative 
literature, and is also statistically significant. Even though they do show 
the expected negative sign, neither the private nor social consumption 
variables are statistically significant.  
 
Finally, the armed force variable is statistically significant and 
carries, as expected, a positive sign. The adjusted R
2 is large at 0.84. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic (DW=1.63) appears low but residual tests 
do not show evidence of serial correlation. Not shown here, for 24 lags, 
all autocorrelations and partial correlations show low Q -statistics and 
high p -values. Also, the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation L M Test 
(with two lags) shows no evidence of serial correlation. It appears that 
our model characterizes the data well, but that neither social nor private 
consumption should affect cyclical homicide puzzled us. Upon further 
investigation, we found a theoretically (and statistically) more satisfying 
model which we discuss in another section (see Amended model). 
 
When considering the time-period beyond 1991 (in bold typeface 
in table 1), the conclusion of having found a satisfactory model does not 
hold so easily. Even though the signs of all coefficients were as 
expected and only the coefficient for private consumption was 
statistically insignificant, the Durbin-Watson statistic suggested, and the 
Q-statistics and the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
confirmed, severe positive serial correlation. With two possible 
exceptions to be discussed shortly there seemed no obvious 
misspecification problem. If there is no misspecification, we would be 
dealing with pure serial correlation, and the coefficient estimates are 
then unbiased. In this case only the standard errors, and thus the t-stats 
and p -values would be affected. Thus, we employed the Newey-West International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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method to produce heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC) estimates (see, e.g., Studenmund, 2001, pp. 334-335). The 




We can think of two reasons for potential model misspecification. One 
is the  possibility of violence inertia (e.g., revenge motives) so that the 
model might need to include a lagged term, say cvp100 -1 (a one-period 
lag of the dependent variable). A second possibility is that we encounter 
in 1991 a  systemic change, requiring an altogether different model for 
the post-1991 period. A priori we like the notion of systemic change 
better. Whereas for weekly or monthly data, we would more readily 
accept the concept of violence inertia, it is not clear why inertia should 
last for the duration of one or more years. For annual data it seems more 
likely that other factors are at work.
viii In contrast, the notion of a 
systemic change is more appealing on the grounds of what actually 
happened in the country. President Gaviria (1990-1994) became, at age 
43, the youngest Colombian president in the 20
th century, and the first 
president of the post-Violencia generation (the “Kennedy” of 
Colombia). This was an important break in Colombian political culture. 
Gaviria pushed through a new constitution, adopted in 1991, that was 
greeted with enthusiasm across the country. And he appointed a former 
M-19 guerrilla leader, Antonio Navarro Wolf, to the post of minister of 
health. Colombian social consumption (health and education 
expenditure) rose drastically, as did other government and private 
consumption. The spending differences to the pre-1991 period are 




We therefore decided to test for a structural break between 1991 
and 1992. This, in turn, not only required a correct model for 1950-1991 
to carry forward to 1992-1999 but allowed us to revisit the question of 
why, in our initial model, social and private consumption did not result 




Starting, then, with the initial 1950-1991 model results as reported in 
table 1, we applied Ramsey’s Regression Specification Error Test 
(RESET) which indeed suggested misspecification. We also ran another International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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stability test, Recursive Coefficient Estimation (RCE), which permits us 
to gauge coefficient instabilities as data points are added to the model.  
A particularly obvious coefficient jump occurred from  1968 to 1970 for 
the social consumption variable (confirmed by figure 4; the thin shaded 
vertical bar). This, combined with the fact that, in table 1, the rCpcap 
and rSpcap coefficients were  statistically insignificant prompted us to 
test whether either or both were redundant. Both variables turned up 
redundant, but rCpcap (private consumption) much more clearly so.
ix 
We thus dropped rCpcap from the model. Next, we added a shift 
dummy (DS) to a ccount for the social consumption-slope shift that 
occurred in 1969 (and another slope-shift in 1996, see figure 4, so that 
DS is coded as 1950-1968=1; 1969-1995=2; 1996-1999=3). The results 




Table 2: Amended model 
 
Dependent variable: cvp100; all numbers are rounded 
The first reported numbers are for 1950-1991; bold numbers are for 
1950-1999 
Estimates for 1950-1999 are Newey-West HAC (see text) 
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Variable  coefficient  std.error  t-stat  p-value 


















































2 = 0.84 (0.80); DW = 1.61 (1.24); F-stat = 44.24 (39.85); p-value 
(F) = 0.0000 (0.0000) 
 
For 1950-1991, while the DW-statistic remains low (DW=1.61), 
neither the Q-tests nor the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
come close to suggesting serial correlation. The RESET still suggests 
misspecification but the recursive coefficient estimates now are clean  
statistically speaking. Unlike RESET, RCE allows us to examine the 
evolution of the coefficient estimates on a year-by-year basis, and it is 
our preferred measure of potential misspecification. We therefore 
decided to accept this model as our final model for the 1950-1991 time 
period. All coefficients conform to prior expectations, and all are 
statistically significant.  La Violencia increased cyclical murder, the 
National Front years decreased it. The trade balance remains 
statistically linked, over this time period, to homicide cycles. Increases 
in social consumption, when adjusted for its break in 1969, are 
significantly related to downturns in the homicide cycle, and the 
increased presence of armed forces is significantly related to upswings 
in the homicide cycle as well. (Recall that we use armed forces as a 
proxy to stand for all fighting forces in the country.) 
 
We now turn to the numbers reported in bold typeface in table 2 International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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and to the question of whether or not the earlier time-period model can 
be carried over to the longer period, i.e., to the possibility of a structural 
break. Note that all coefficients are again of the expected sign, and all 
are statistically significant. The adjusted R
2 is high (0.80) but there now 
exists severe serial correlation again. The Chow Breakpoint Test could 
not be run since we have only eight data points for the 1992-1999 
period. Thus, we employed the Chow Forecast Test. This runs the 1950-
1991 model, forecasts the values of the dependent variable (cvp100), 
and then compares the forecast with the actual values. 
 
This test rejects the null hypothesis of no structural break (F=2.87, 
p=0.014; LR=24.65, p=0.0018). It is, however, not clear just what this 
statistically identified structural break would consist of. Except for 
rSpcap (because a third dummy value kicks in for 1996), the estimated 
coefficients between the 1950-1991 and the 1950-1999 time periods are 
nearly identical. Moreover, as may be seen in figure 5, when we took 
the shorter-period model and did an ordinary forecast of cvp100 and 
compared that forecast to the actual cvp100 data, the model certainly 
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Despite the Chow test we therefore accept our model for the longer 
period also.
xi,xii We thus conclude that our model, consisting of variables 
for  La Violencia, the National Front years, the real trade balance per 
capita, real social consumption per capita, and armed force personnel 
(as a proxy for all armed forces in the country), explains about eighty 
percent of the observed movement in the cyclical murder variable for 




Provided with a data series of homicide cycles in Colombia, 1950-1999, 
we built a structural model to explain the movements in that time series 
of data. We find that obvious variables, such as coding for the  La 
Violencia and the National Front years, are statistically significant (and 
of the expected sign). Further, we find that increases in real social 
expenditure (on health and education) reduce murder cycles and that 
increases in the size of the armed forces (as a proxy for all fighting 
factions) increase murder cycles. We also find, as the narrative literature 
suggests, that an increase in the real trade balance leads to upswings in 
cyclical murder. The underlying hypothesis is that trade balance 
improvements derive from commodity booms (coffee, cocaine) that 
make land more valuable and the contest over land more severe. To see 
if this finding is merely an artifact of statistical modeling is worth 
investigation in greater detail in separate research. 
 
The methodological approach of separating homicide into trend and 
cyclical components opens up research possibilities in a number of 
previously closed off directions. These include a re-examination of 
(trend) homicide to learn if such a series would now track with 
economic conditions such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality 
(recall that the literature currently does not find a link between these 
variables and overall homicide). Likewise, we have begun to collect 
homicide data for each of Colombia’s 33 departamentos, or provinces. 
We would expect trend homicide to be explained across regions by the 
same set of variables, but cyclical homicide will probably look very 
different across regions, especially that part of cyclical homicide International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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directly associated with political violence which we know is heavily 
concentrated in particular regions of the country and more likely to be 
heavily influenced by commodity-booms and the presence of armed 
forces. The data decomposition technique can also be used to examine 
non-homicidal crime (e.g., kidnapping, hostage taking) and, indeed, can 
be used to examine crime data for other countries plagued, as Colombia, 
with severe unrest. 
 
The results reported in this paper are encouraging as they appear to 
capture murder cycles in Colombia well and, in particular, give some 
statistical credence to what commentators in the narrative literature have 
long suspected, namely that the drug-trade finances the political 
struggle and that state social expenditure might be an important tool to 
lessen the violence. 
 
 
Appendix: data sources 
 
All monetary variables were obtained in nominal terms and converted to 
inflation-adjusted or real terms with the implicit GDP deflator 
(1994=100). The deflator is obtained for 1946-49 from CEPAL, for 
1950-1980 from  Banco de la República (Central Bank of Colombia), 
and for 1981-1999 from  Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadística (DANE). Per capita adjustments are made on the basis of 
total population (millions) counts coming from the censuses of 1953, 
1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1993 and projections by DANE.  
 
Nominal social expenses (in millions of Colombian pesos) consists of 
health expenditures and education expenditures. For 1946-1970, taken 
from “Estado y Hacienda Publica en Colombia, 1934-1990,” by César 
Giraldo ( Contraloría General de La Repúbica); for 1971-1999, taken 
from financial reports of the General Comptrollers Office of Colombia.  
 
Nominal trade balance data (millions of Colombian pesos) is obtained 
as the difference of exports and imports of goods and services; Banco 
de la República (Colombian Central Bank), DANE, and calculations by Brauer, J. and Gomez-Sorzano, A.            Homicides Cycles in Colombia, 1950-1999 
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the  Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Planning 
Department), Macroeconomic Studies Unit. Nominal private 
consumption (millions of Colombian pesos);  Banco de la República, 
DANE, and calculations by the National  Planning Department, 
Macroeconomic Studies Unit. Nominal government consumption 
(millions of Colombian pesos);  Banco de la República, DANE, and 
calculations by the National Planning Department, Macroeconomic 
Studies Unit.  
 
The data for the total number of personnel of the Colombian police (PF) 
and for the total number of active members of the armed forces both 
come from the National Planning Department, Justice and Security 
Unit.  
 
The coding for the years of La Violencia and the National Front years 
are t aken from Bushnell, 1993. Total homicides are the sum of four 
murder series: murder ( homicidio), aggravated murder ( homicidio 
agravado), murder with terrorist intent (homicidio con fin terrorista), 
and death associated with the exercise of official duties (homicidio con 
función, razón cargo o ejercicio de sus funciones). The data are taken 
from various issues of  Revista Criminalidad; Colombian National 
Police. Finally, the cyclical component of total homicides is reported in 
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i. Indeed, Rubio (1997) and others have made persuasive arguments according 
to which the educated and uneducated classes both engage in criminal and 
violent activity for the simple reason that crime pays well. Income and 
education are no longer linked, but income and crime are (Rubio, 1997, p. 
812). Average annual incomes from crime have been variously estimated at up 
to $70,000 per person, a huge premium over Colombia’s per capita 1995 GDP 
of around $1,800 (Bejarano, 1997, p. 12). The break-down of the Colombian 
justice system further encourages criminal and violent behavior, as the 
probability of being caught, tried, and convicted is becoming smaller over time. 
By 1994, convictions rates had dropped to below four percent (Rubio, 1998a, 
p. 606), and sentences rarely exceeded six months of jail time (Rubio, 1998b, 
p. 91). 
ii. There is widespread agreement among analysts that Colombia’s violence is 
costly, both at the microeconomic level (e.g., Dinar and Keck, 1997) and at the 
macroeconomic level, estimated at up to 15 percent of GDP (Bejarano, 1997, p. 
10). There is some evidence that major perpetrators of violence B the military 
and paramilitary forces, the drug-traders, and the various guerrilla groups B act 
in semi-collusive fashion to keep the spoils of war going (Richani, 1997), 
evidence in line with the theory suggested by Brito and Intriligator (1992). 
iii. For a history of Colombia see, e.g., Bushnell (1993). On the role and links International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies .Vol.1-1(2004)  
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between and among police, army, and para-military troops in the Colombian 
conflict see, e.g., Giraldo (1996). For a recent, popular (and personal) account, 
see Kirk (2003). 
iv. According to reports in The Wall Street Journal and The Economist, 
numbers for 2002 run at about 22,000 members for FARC and ELN, the two 
largest rebel groups, perhaps 10,000 to 12, 000 para-military troops, and 
another 5,000 or so drug-related troops. The Colombian armed forces weigh in 
at about 150,000 (including 50,000 salaried, professional troops) and the police 
force at 100,000. 
v. We know from the African experience that natural-resource riches attract 
contestants (see Sambanis, 2002, for a literature review on this and other 
aspects of the economics of civil wars). 
vi. In the statistical work, we used two measures for real social consumption 
per capita, both derived from Colombian data sources but differing in 
magnitude. Both resulted in nearly identical coefficients for our models. We 
therefore report the model results using only one of the two social consumption 
variables (see appendix). 
vii. Note the overlap of the B and CL dummy variables for 1958, 1959, and 
1960. For these years, the combined effect on cvp100, relative to the intercept, 
would be the sum of the coefficients for these two variables (i.e., +5.86 in the 
1950-1991 model for the years 1958-1960). To learn what difference the 
coding might make, we also coded the La Violencia years (variable B) to last 
only until 1957 (i.e., without overlap). Although magnitudes change, the signs 
of all coefficients are unchanged and, in most cases, their statistical 
significance is unaffected. In any event, our final coding (with the overlap) 
follows the descriptive literature on Colombia and is the theoretically preferred 
measure to use. 
viii. Some argue that in Latin America violence inertia is a cultural 
phenomenon and should be modeled. To accommodate this notion, we 
modeled a one-period time-lag and examined the statistical results even though 
the use of lagged dependent variables introduces its own estimation validity 
problems. In our case, use of the lagged dependent variable drowned out all of 
the other explanatory variables. We would, in essence, explain today’s violence 
with yesterday’s. This is not satisfying from a policy perspective, and we did Brauer, J. and Gomez-Sorzano, A.            Homicides Cycles in Colombia, 1950-1999 
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not further pursue the use of the lagged independent variable. 
ix. The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.95, suggesting 
the presence of a  multicollinearity problem in the initial model. Simply 
dropping a variable in the presence of multicollinearity is inappropriate when 
the variable in question is theoretically relevant. In our case, though, there is a 
stronger theoretical case in favor of retaining the social consumption, rather 
than the private consumption, variable since homicide is a social phenomenon. 
x. Coding the step-dummy (DS) as 1, 2, and 3 implies that the effect between 
the first and second period is the same as that between the second and third 
period. When using values of 1, 2, and 4 as well as of 1, 2, and 5, we retain all 
signs as well as, roughly, the magnitudes and statistical significance for all 
variables except of course for DS*rSpcap (which changes in magnitude only, 
becoming smaller) and for CL (which changes in statistical significance only, 
becoming statistically insignificant at DS=5). 
xi. For those fearing that we are pulling too many strings, note that it has been 
shown that the Chow Breakpoint and Forecast tests can lead to inconsistent 
results (in which one rejects and the other accepts the null hypothesis). For an 
instructive example see, e.g., E-Views4 User=s Guide, pp. 364-366. 
xii. It is important to realize that we took the 1950-1991 model B in which DS 
= 1, 2 B and forecast the cvp100 values for 1992 to 1999. The forecast of 
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